Lingnan University

Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
Centre for Public Policy Studies : CPPS Working Centre for Public Policy Studies 公共政策研究中
Paper Series
心
2-1998

Worker participation and firm performance : evidence from
Germany and Britain
John T. ADDISON
W. Stanley SIEBERT
Joachim WAGNER
Xiangdong WEI
Lingnan College, Hong Kong, xdwei@ln.edu.hk

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/cppswp
Part of the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons

Recommended Citation
Addison, J. T., Siebert, W. S., Wagner, J., & Wei, X. (1998). Worker participation and firm performance:
Evidence from Germany and Britain (CPPS Working Papers Series no.74). Retrieved from Lingnan
University website: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/cppswp/108

This Paper Series is brought to you for free and open access by the Centre for Public Policy Studies 公共政策研究
中心 at Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Centre for Public Policy
Studies : CPPS Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.

Working Paper Series
Centre for Public Policy Studies

No . 74

(2月 8)

CPPS

WORKER PARTICIPATION AND
FIRM PERFORMANCE:
EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY AND
BRITAIN
by
Professor J ohn T. Addison
Professor W . Stanley Siebert
Professor Joachim Wagner
Dr. Xiangdong Wei

Faculty of Social Sciences
Lingnan College
Hong Kong
香港嶺南學院

社會科學院

No . 74

(2月 8)

CPPS

WORKER PARTICIPATION AND
FIRM PERFORMANCE :
EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY AND
BRITAIN
by
Professor John T. Addison
Professor W. Stanley Siebert
Professor J oachim Wagner
Dr. Xiangdong Wei

嶺南學院圖書館

- 8 JAN 1999
Ll NGNAN COLLEGE LJBRARY

Faculty of Social Sciences
Lingnan College
HongKong
February 1998

WORKER PARTICIPATION M~D FIRM PERFORMANCE:
EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY AND BRI1
叮
l'、'AINd

CAPS and CPPS Working Papers are circulated to invite discussion and critical
comment. Opinions expressed in them are the author's and should not be taken as
representing the opinions of the Centres or Lingnan College. These papers may be freely
circulated but they are not to be quoted without the written permission of the author
Please address comments and suggestions to the author or the series editors

。 10hn

T . Addison , W . Stanley Siebert吉 10achim Wagner and
Xiangdong Wei

Professor 10hn T. Addison , CSAB , Washington University , and University
of South Carolina.
Professor W . Stanley Siebert, Department of
Binningham.
Professor JoachiIn Wag11er , Institut für
Lüneburg.

Commerce 雪 University

of

VolkswirtschaftslehrιUniversität

D r. Xiangdong Wei is a University Lecturer in the Department of
Economics 雪 Lingnan College , Hong Kong .

Faculty of Social ScÍences
Lingnan College
Tuen Mun
Hong Kong
Tel : 2616 7429-32
Fax : 2591 0690

Worker Participation and Firm Performance:
Evidence fTom Germany.and Britain+

10hn T. Addison , * W. Stanley

Siebe此，叫 10achim

Wagner , *料

and

Xiangdong Wei ****

November 1997

Abs甘act

This paper examines the Freeman-Lazear works councillworker involvement model against
the empirical backdrop of two different industrial relations systems: the British
voluntaristic system , and the German system of mandatory works councils. We fmd that
in nonunion British frrms worker involvement increases economic performance , but in the
union frrms there are negative effects. The implication

is 也at

local distributive conflict

can cause the wrong level of worker involvement to be chosen , as predicted by the mode l.
ln Germany , where

cen甘alized

collective bargaining reduces local

dis甘ibutive

conflict , we

find that a mandate can be advantageous , again as predicted by the mode l. However , the
strai~jacket

of a mandate is shown to disadvantage small German frrffis.
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of the involvement of workers in their
companies on various indicators of frrm performance. A comparison is drawn between
Germany , with

its 甘adition

of mandatory works councils , and Britain , long characterized

by its voluntaristic system of industrial relations. The theoretical backdrop

to 也is

ioquiry

is the influential model of direct participation offered by Freeman and Lazear (1995) .

Interest in worker participation is

at 組 all-time

high , and the influence

of 出e

German institution is palpable. Practical manifestations are the works council directive
enacted into law by the European Commission (Official Joumal , 1994) , establishing
multinational works councils in European-level enterprises , and a backlog of more
thorough-going participation initiatives including the proposed European Company Statute
and the draft Fifth Directive on Company Law (Addison and

Sie悅目，

1997). Even in the

United States , stimulated by a precipitous de c1 ine in private-sector unionism , the recent
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations (1994a , 1994b) actively
considered adoption of German-type participative institutions.

A comparison of the effect of German works councils with analogous though less
authoritative institutions in Britain (in the form of consultation and joint consultative
committees) allows one to consider a number of questions raised

in 出e

participation

literature. Specifically , the distinction between endogenously chosen (the U .K.) and
mandatory worker participa位on (Germany) assists in guiding the measurement of e仔ects
of participation on frrm performance . At same time , comparison of the two coun凹的
addresses concems having to do with the alI eged shortfall of participation in regular
m訂kets

that have motivated much of the policy debate.

The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a modified version of the
Freeman-Lazear model to fLX ideas as to the relation between worker involvement and the
relevant dimensions of fum performance. Section 3 provides institutional detail. The
datasets employed , the WIRS and the Hannover Firm Panel , are reviewed in Section 4 ,
toge也er with the equation specifications. Section 5 charts the impact of the participative

1

institutions on measures of frrm productivity , profitability , wages , and employment. An
interpretative section concludes.

2. Theoretical Coojectures
Our starting point is the model of the works council provided by Freeman and
La zear (1995). Figure 1 is a modification of their basic diagram. The model we present is

somewhat more general , relating as it does the intensity of structured "worker
involvement ," rather than works council power , to the tota1 surplus
Specifically ，出e R(x) 如此tion maps 也is

inv01vement, x. As shown ,

of 出e

enterprise.

joint surplus against the level of worker

al也ough 組 absence

of any formal worker involvement is

consistent with some positive surplus , the introduction of increasingly structured forms of
involvement yields increases in surplus , at least up to some point. Accordingly , R(x) has
an inverted-U shape. We add flesh to this barebones concept of

、甘uctured

worker

involvement ," and the forms it takes in Britain and Germany in section 3.

[Figure 1 near here]

More specifically , Freeman and
Wl由 worker

Lazear 訂gue 血at

the joint surplus will increase

involvement both because management and labor have nonoverlapping

relevant information sets and by reason of the creativity of discussion. Thus , for example ,
the provision of objective infornlation by the flfm increases efficiency by facilitating
worker cooperation in tough times when labor might otherwise be disinclined to believe
management assertions as to the state of nature. Similarly , the disclosure of private
information by the worker side raises the joint surplus. Proceeding one stage further than
information disclosure per se , consultation allows new solutions to production and other
workplace problems because discussion is creative. Additionally , participation or
codetermination is said to provide workers with greater security , thereby encouraging
them to take a longer view of the prospects of the firm. These are the advantages. The
downside

is 出at

worker involvement has the disadvantage that it delays decisionmaking. A

further disadvantage noted by Freeman and Lazear (1995 ,

29) 自由at

as worker

involvement increases there comes a point where "management does not have enough
control over decisions." For both reasons , there is thus some optimum level of worker
2

involvement , x* in the figure.

If 也e

R(x) function did not have a maximum , then the

issue of choosing the degree of worker involvement would not arise.

Decisions about the desired amount of worker involvement are determined not only
by 由e

R(x) function , but also by distributional considerations. Freeman and Lazear appeal

to standard results in
s(x) , increases as x

barga~g 也eory

increases. 叭1t

and

argue 出at

the worker share in the surplus ,

simply , knowledge is power. As the workers'

knowledge increases , so too must their share. Thus , information disclosure by
m組agement

is a two-edged sword. On the one hand , it validates

m組ageme帥's

claims as

to the state of nature but on the other it potentially facilitates rent seeking on the part of
workers. Similarly , workers will only divulge their private information to management if
they have some say in

how 由at

information is used (Freeman and

Laze缸，

1995 , 39).

Greater worker involvement on these lines means less management discretion.
Accordingly , worker share in the surplus may be expected to rise.

The second bold curve in Figure 1 shows the firm' s
assumption 也at

worker involvement. Because of the

pro白的 F(x) ，

as a funçtion of

the worker share increases with

worker involvement, F(x) peaks before R(x) does. As a result , there will be an underproyjsion of worker involvement ,

Xf.

This result is used by Freeman and Lazear as a

justification for a participation mandate; specifically , one that guarantees x..

Implicit in Freeman and
shown by the dashed line in

Lazear's 甘eatment

Figu~e

is a further profit functioo , G(x) ,
di仔erent s(x) 如nction

1. O(x) is predicated on a

-a

smaller increase in the work:ers' share as worker involvement increases , made possible by
a partial decoupling of production and
argue (Freeman and
the frrffi under

Laze缸，

cen甘alized

less

optimum.

necessary 血an

Such a decoupling is achievable , they

1995 , 32) , in regimes where wages are determined

outsir1~

coUective bargaining (or , we would add , an absence of

collective bargaining). It can be
participa位on

dis仕ibution.

In 也is

seen 由at

the maximum

of 由is

curve is closer

to 由e

situation , a mandate of x. wilI increase participation , but

where there

is 也e

local

dis甘ibutive

3

bargaining underlying F(x).

Next; tuming to the worker side , where there is no local bargaíning (corresponding
to profit function G(x)) , worker choices are ÍlTelevant. However , in the more

gen釘al

case , worker choices will matter. For example , given the profit function F(x) , if workers
could choose the amount of worker ïnvolvement , they would select Jt.v. At

Jt.v血e

difference between R(x) and F(x) is maximized , with workers seeking to maximize their
share

of 出e

joint surplus. This exceeds the socially optimal level of worker involvement ,

just as management's choice fell short

of 也at

of bargaining , the outcome wilI lie between

level. If worker involvement is the subject

Xw 剖ld 焉，

according to relative bargaining

power. As can be seeo , such bargaining can result in increases or decreases in the joint
surplus.

In sum , without collective bargaining , the degree of worker involvement is more

likely to be close to the social optimum than with it. To repeat , the relevant profit
func位on for 也is

出at

of the

case

is 也e

F(x) 我lnction.

也at cen甘alization

G(x)

With

function ，也e

cen甘alized

peak of which lies closer to

does

bargaining the position is similar , if we accept

means that there is less scope for distributive bargaining at locallevel.

The situation is least predictable from an efficiency perspective if there are
toge也er

x﹒也an

s缸ong

unions

with local bargaining rights because the F(x) profit function now applies. The

introduction of a mandate requiring x. worker involvement wiU. here havea more marked
effect on f lI m profit

th組 in

union-free environments or situations of cen甘alized

barg也ning.

We are now in a position to summarize the predictions

of 由e

theory. In union-free

envlIonments :
(a) the level of worker involvement will be chosen so that the total surplus is close to the
optimum , x.;
(b) an increase in worker involvement will only be adopted if it increases profit and
consequently total surplus. (Of course , for there to be an increase in worker involvem t.
the prior level must have been rendered inappropriate by changing circumstances.)
Changes in worker involvement are therefore expected to be directly linked to changes
total surplus.

4

And for union regimes with local distributive bargaining:
(a) the level of worker involvement is unlikely to be chosen

so 出 at

total surplus is at or

near a maXlrnum;
(b) any observed increase in worker involvernent need not be accornpanied by increases in
total surplus , but will be associated with a decline in profitability. Again , however , we
should look to a relationship between changes in variables.

Particularly in the nonunion case , because the choice of the amount of worker
involvement is endogenous - and distributive bargaining is
we do not expect a link between the level

of 也is

no 也reat

(curve G(x) applies) -

variable and the level of the joint

surplus . Nonunion firms are managed so as to achieve near-maximum total surplus.
Whatever level of worker involvernent , be it high or low , that is necessary to achieve such
performance will already have been chosen by managemen t. Thus we expect no link
between levels here. For unionized frrffis , on the other hand , the situation is more
complicated because of the joint nature of

con甘0 1.

Too high a level of worker

involvement would be revealed by a negative association between the level of worker
involvement and the level of total surplus.

A comparison of levels can be expected to be informative where worker
involvement is at least partly outside the con甘01 of the frrm , as in Germany. In the
German case , works councils are mandatory but not automatic; 也ey have to be activated
by the worker side . Workers can be expected to choose a works council if it increases
their share of the joint surplus. Where observed , therefore , works councils should be
associated with lower profitability. As far as total surplus is concemed , an appropriately
choseo mandate - where this is possible - should increase it.

In reality , a rnandate has to confront 也e problem of frrm heterogeneity. A diagram
such as Figure 1 can be drawn for each firrn. There is

00

reason to expect the maximum

of R(x) to correspond to the same level of worker involvement in each case. Most
obviously , large firms are more likely to benefit from 也e structured worker iovolvement
implied by a works council than their smal1 er counterparts: x. wiII be higher for large than

5

small frrms . The implication 自由at although total surplus in large frrffis could be
increased by a works council mandate , this is unlikely to obtain in small frrms.

3. Institutional Framework
We think of structured worker involvement as a continuum , ranging from
information provision through consultation to participation/codetermination. The
mechanisms whereby worker involvement is furthered , and the role of government , are of
course quite

di釘erent

case , often regarded

in the two countries. We begin our discussion

as 也e

wi出 the

German

exemplar of industrial democracy and hence located

at 也c

upper bound of the continuum.

In Germany , information , consultation , and participation are forma l1y prescribed
by law and enshrined in the apparatus of the Works Council (Betriebsrat). 1 This body
shares some similarities with its British

"counterp訂t'" 出e ‘joint

consultative committee ,

described below , even if the latter is nowhere near as authoritative.

Although the German works council is mandatory , it is not automatic. First there
is a size threshold of five permanent employees , all of whom must be at least 18 years of
age and three of whom must have at least six months' service. Second , a works council
must be elected. 1ust three employees with voting rights (namely , 18-year olds and
above) , or

a 甘ade

union represented in the establishment , are needed to call for a works

meeting to elect an electoral board , which is then responsible for holding the election. 2
Once this procedure is activated , the works council is a fait accompli.

The works council is elected by the entire labor force , with the exception of
employers and senior executives. All employees

wi也 voting

rights are entitled to submit

lists of candidates provided these have the support of at least 5 percent of employees.
Unions may submit a list of candidates without having to meet this minimum requirement;
union lists must be signed by two representatives. Wage earners and salaried employees
may have separate or , as is increasingly the norm , joint lists of candidates.

Elec位ons

are

direct and by secret ballot , wi也 winners elected on the basis of proportional representation
from these lists.
6

The law fixes the size

of 出e

works council , which ranges from one

to 惱的 -one

members for establishments with up to 9 ,000 employees. For larger establishments , two
additional members are added for each increment of 3 ,000 employees. 3 The expenses of
the works council apparatus are bome by the employer , including release time for parttime councillors and the wages of full-time councillors. The number of the latter is a

“

nction of the employment size of the plant. 4 As we shall see , the influence of the works

council also depends (in part) on plant size , so that it is not

s甘ictly

correct to refer to the

German legislation as a one-size-fits-all mandate.

Tuming therefore to the rules goveming the information , consultation , and
codetermination rights of works councils , the employer has frrst to provide the works
council with both timely and "comprehensive" information to enable it to discharge its
general duties and

on 叩ecific

matters relating to manpower planning and the introduction

of new technology and production processes. The quantity of information (and
consultation) is a function of establishment size. Thus , in establishments with more than
20 employees , information must be given "in full and in good time" on reductions in
operations and the

in甘oduction

more 血泊 1 ∞ employees

of new working methods , inter al., and in plants with

an economic committee must be set up. This standing body ,

appointed by the works council , has to be fu l1y informed on the current

and 臼ture

economic situation of the frrm and be supplied with all relevant economic and financial
information.

Consultation

righ~可 for

their part cover planned structural alterations to the plant

and prospective changes in equipment and working

methods 出at

affect job requirements ,

all decisions relating to manpower planning , and individual dismissals. 1n the latter case ,
failure to consult

resulû可 in

the dismissal being rendered null and void.

The ha11mark of the German institution , however , is its codetermination

rightsι

"social matters." These include the commencement and termination of working hours; ti
regulation of overtime and reduced working hours; leave arrangements; the

in甘oductioI

and use of technical devices to monitor employee performance; remuneration
arrangements , including the fixing of job and bonus rates 'and other forms of performance
7

‘

related pay; and

hωl由 and

safety measures. Failure to reach agreement in any of these

areas leads to their adjudication through a

fon)1a~

çonciliation apparatus.

Where the establishment normally employs

more 出個 20

employees

wi由 voting

rights , the works council al so has a set of somewhat weak:er consent rights covering the
,

engagement , grading/regrading , and transfer of workers within the frrm. Consent rights
worb可 council

also obtain in the case of individual dismissals , noted earlier. If tþe

withholds its consent , however , the employer can apply to the labor court for a decisioß in
lieu of that consent.

The works council can negotiate social compensation p]ans (Sozialpläne) and works
agreemenv可 (Betriebsvereinbarungen).

In all plants norm a11y employing more than 20

employees , works councils have separate rights to demand compensation for the
dislocation caused by plant closings ,
plans、 may

m~jor

changes in organization , and the like. Social

be regarded as a special case of works agreements. The latter cannot cover

remuneration and other conditions of employment unless expressly
relevant

indus甘y /regional

au也orized

under the

collective agreement. In fact , framework agreements at industry

level have increasingly made provision for their implementation at local level. But beyond
曲的，

there is every

indication 也at

bilateral plant level agreements have in practice ranged

well beyond those prescribed by the law (Müller-Jentsch , 1995 , 60-61). This proliferation
of works agreements might therefore hint at rent seeking behavior , although such behavior
can clearly find expression outside of form a1 agreement. 5

A final issue is the relation between works councils and unions per se. Works
councils are formally independent of unions , but the links between the two have become
increasingly close. Today not only are the large

m~jority

of works councillors union

members (74 percent) but some two-thirds are also union nominees
Although union density is not a datum in

wor}Q可 council

(Niedenho缸，

1995)

regimes , we were unable to

exploit this variation in our emp甘ical ana1ysis of the German data (see below).6

The British case is more briefly dealt with given the tradition a1 voluntaristic
approach towards worker involvement. 7 The forms tak:en by worker involvement are
8

much less well-defined than in Germany and we have been guided in our measurements
primari1y by the information available in the dataset , the Workplace Industria1 Relations
Survey (WIRS) , on which more below. We shall distinguish between formal and informal
involvement , drawing on section L ("Consultation and Communìcation") of the survey
questionnaire. Under the heading of formal methods of involvement , our main measure is
obtained from question L1 , namely , whether the establishment has a joint manageremployee committee "primarily concerned

wi也 consultation

rather than negotiation" (and

excluding committees dealing with single issues such as health and safety). We shall refer
to "these bodies as "joint consultative committees" (JCCs). Under the informal heading ,
our measure relies on question L 19 , namely , whether management uses regular roeetings
to "communicate or consu1t with their employees". These regular

mee位ngs

include

"quality circles ," other problem-solving groups , and "briefing groups". The survey
identifies other dimensions of communica位on and consultation , including the topics
considered at the meetings , but these are not exploited in the
fUI油er

analysis , see Siebert and

W缸，

present 仕eatment

(but for

1996).

JCCs are almost as prevalent in union as nonunion establishments , according to the
WIRS data. Among establishments recognising unions , about 20 percent have JCCs in our
sample; the corresponding figure for nonunion establishments is 18 percent. Regular
meetings to communicate or consult - our informal measure - are somewhat more
prevalent in union establishments (74 percent) than nonunion (61 percent).

As was argued in section 2 , it is important to consider not only levels of but also
changes in communication and consultation in the British case (where communication and
consultation are endogenous to a greater extent than in Germany). Unfortunately , the
WIRS considers only positive changes (that 尬， increases) , namely , "any change within the
last 3 y側的 with the aim of increasing employee involvement in the operation of the
enterprise" (question L23). Again we focus on JCCs and regular informal meetings .
Increases in JCCs include reorganization , or the setting up of a new committee , while
mcreases

10

meetings include more meetings for the purposes of generaI consultation , on

produc位on or productivity , and for discussio nJ communication of 0由er topics including job

appraisal.
9

In this paper , therefore , measurement of worker involvement in British firms boils
down to the machinery of a joint consultative council (JCC) and/or regular meetings to
communicate or consult with employees. Both of these are zero-one dummies. They are
used in level and change form. ln the German case , the measure of worker involvement is
whether the frrm has a works council. For Britain , we also construct an index of worker
involvement (INV) taking the value of 0 if there is neither a JCC nor regular
communication/consultation meetings , of 1 where there are just
communication/consultation meetings , of 2 if there is only a JCC , and of 3 if there are
both

mee位ngs

and a JCC. An analogous index of change in worker involvement

(NEWIN V) is a1so used , based on changes in communication/consultation meetings and/or
JCCs. The index of change in worker involvement is appropriate when the dependent
variable is measured in change form.

4. Data and Specification
Our British dataset

自由e

1990 WIRS , a survey within England , Scotland and

Wales of 2 ,061 establishments employing 25 or more workers. The response rate was 83
percent. (See Millward et al. , 1992 , for a complete description

of 也is

survey and

information on its precursors of 1984 and 1980.) Larger workplaces were oversampled by
design and a11 our results make use the weights included in WIRS to make them
representative of the national sample of establishments. The sample is restricted to private
nonagricultural establishments. The sample is 863 for the employment change equations ,
but falls to around

5∞ when

the other measures of performance are used due to missing

values .

For the analysis of the British data , we emphasize the union-nonunion distinction.
This distinction is based upon whether establishments have a written agreement
recognizing unions , either manual or nonmanual , for the purposes of negotiating pay and
conditions of employment. Our samples are split almost equally between union and
nonunion establishments.

The German data used in this inquiry were taken from the frrst wave (conducted in
1994) of a panel study investigating various aspects of frrm behavior and performance.
10

The research

proje仗，

the Hannover Firm Panel , comprises four annual waves (see below).

The population covered encompasses al1 manufacturing establishments with at least five
employees in the province of Lo wer Saxony. The sample of establishments is stratified
according to firm size and industry , with oversampling of larger frrms. 8

As with the WIRS , mterviews were held with the owner or top manager of the
establishment, often assisted by personnel management in the larger frrms. Some 1,025
establishments or 51 percent of all those approached agreed to take part in the frrst wave.
rate ，由e

Despite the high attrition

deviation between the

acωal

and planned

s虹atification

is relatively small.

The questionnaire used in the survey asks approximately 90 numbered questions.
The questions vary by wave. The frrst and the third waves focus squarely on labour
market issues , whereas the second and fourth waves - which omit the works council
question - focus rather more .on intemational issues. Themes addressed in the former
waves include personnel

s甘ucture

and development , wages and salaries , working time , the

determinants of employment , and frrm performance. 9

Although. the item

re中onse

rate is relatively high for most questions in the survey ,

almost one-third of the sample (318 establishments)

responded 也at

they did not know the

level of workplace union density. Furthermore , inspection of the data led us to question
the accuracy of the positive responses (on which , see Addison , Schnabel , and Wagner ,
1992b). In the circumstances , we determined that it would be misleading to provide
estimates of the association between union density and the outcome indicators. This is
unfortunate because union density might usefully augment the dummy variable indicating
出e

presence or otherwise of a works council in the outcome equations. That said , unliI

the British case , the union-nonunion distinction does not motivate the German analysis
which instead focuses on differences between small and large establishments.

It is important to note that , despite their mandatory natu凹， in weighted terms

works councils occur in just 20.1 percent of the German establishments , even if these dG

11

account for the lion'sshare , 73.4 percent , of employment. Similar results have been
reported by Frick and Sadowski (1995) in an employment-based survey of establishments.

Turning next to the issue of specification , we first review our four outcome
variables. Broadly speaking , apart from the fact

that 也ree of 出e

four outcome indicators

are in levels for Germany (not inappropriate in terms of the applied theoretical model in
section 2 given "mandatory
correspondence

between、 the

notable difference

挖出at

participationη ，

we were able to achieve reasonable

performance equations for the two

coun甘ies.

The most

the German productivity variable is a continuous measure of

value added per worker un1 ike its British productivity change counterpart , which is a
su~jectively

defined five-category measure (derived

from 血em組ager' s

answer to the

question "In your opinion how does the level of labour productivity here compare

wi也

what it was 3 years ago?"). lO The dependent variable in the German wage equation

扭曲e

wage and salary bi l1 divided by the number of employees , similar to the British measure ,
also in levels , which is a weighted average calculated over separateskill categories. 11 The
three-category relative profit measure is to all intents and purposes the same for the two
countries (derived from the answer to the question "How would you assess the financial
performance of this establishment compared with other establishments in the same
indus甘y? ").
to 曲at

Likewise , the employment change variable for Germany closely corresponds

for Britain , .each being calculated over a three

ye訂 interval.

Our key independent variables are of course the participation measures. We earlier
commented in some detail on the British measures of formal and informal worker
involvement , as well as 也e construction of an index fashioned out of each. We also
described our measures of the changes in worker involvement. By
measure is simpler and blunter: a single dummy variable

con甘ast

signifying 由e

the German

presence or

otherwise of a works council. The German dataset does not allow us to distinguish
between possible "types" of works councils. Given that 曲e powers of the works council
do vary formally (and likely in practice also) by establishment size (see section 3) ,
however , we present results for the total sample and for a subsample of smaller
establishments .employing between 21 個d 1 ∞ employees. The lower probability of

12

observing works councils among such smaller firms provides additional grounds for this
sample construction.
There are clearly many other factors that affect both levels of and changes in frrm
performance and we need to

con甘01

for these. At root , firm performance must be

determined by management ability or good fortune. The variables included in our
performance equations can bethought of as more or less adequately proxying these elusive
quali位的.

Performance will a1so be determined by cyclical factors , and by the degree of

risk of the industry.

Our

con甘ols

for the German and British samples are similar , although of course

we are constrained by the data at our disposal. (A comparable set of controls is used in
Fernie 缸ld

Metcalf, 1995.) ln addition to broad

Britain , 31 in the case of Gennany) , we

con甘01

indus甘y

dummies (9 in the case of

for several characteristics of the

workforce such as the importance of female workers , part timers , ski l1 ed manual workers ,
個d

由e

shiftworkers. These proportions might be thought of as picking up factors relating
cyclicality and/or riskiness of the establishment' s market ,

so 血at

t，。

in general - outside

of the wage equation - we have no clear-cut priors. For example , a establishment using
many part timers might be subject to cyclical demand changes. If mistakes are more likely
to be made in such situations , then performance could be adversely affected. A further
variable falling within this category is whether or not the establishment produces a product
primarily for export.

Variables more directly related

ωmanagement

ability include , frrstly , the age of

the establishment. (Note that establishment age in the German sample is not continuous
since the survey only records whether the establishment was set up before 1960.) The age
variable might pick up the possibility that the newer entrants have the better ideas.
Alternative旬，

the long-lived establishmen~可 might have proven management , so that the

outcome could go either way.

Second旬，

the payment system variables - namely , the use

of payment by results for some sections of the workforce , and the use of profit-sharing
schemes - might indicate a forward-looking management , keen to expeliment. 12 A similar
argument justifies the .inclusion of the technology variable , indicating the use of automated
13

or

"s個te

of the art" plant and equipment. In the British case , we are also able to include a

union density variable which is relevant because it could
也is

cons甘ain

experimentation. (Note ,

variable is also relevant for nonunion establishments; even if they do oot recognize

unions for collective bargaining purposes , they will still have union members.)

Thirdly , market dominance might signal managerial ability - as well as the
possibility of monopoly rents. We control for market dominance in several ways:
establishment size , whether the establishment is

p紅t

of a multi-plant firm , and whether

the establishment has few competitors. Managers in smaller establishments might also
have

di前erent

tastes - a desire for "independence" - which could translate into lower

performance.

Finally , the German dataset offers possibilities of further variables that are specific
to individual outcome equations. For the profit equation , there are dummies denoting , in
the opinion of the management respondent , excessive wage and nonwage costs. And in the
employment change equation , there are dummies
wages exceeding those set in the

indus住y

identi句ing

short-time working and

tariff agreement. For the wage (and value-

added) equation(s) the length of the average working week also enters as a regressor. A
capacity utilization measure proxying demand conditions is furthermore incorporated in
the value-added ,

pro鼠，

and employment change

equa位。肘，

where a direct association is

expected. The variable takes the form of an index constructed from responses to a sixelement categorical

ques位。n

in the survey , the lowest value of the index characterizing

capacity utilization of less than 85 percent.

5. Findings
Summary findings for Germany and Britain are presented in Table 1. Full results
for Britain are contained in Tables 2 through 5 , distinguishing between nonunion and
union establishrnents. Detailed findings for Germany are given in Tables

6 也rough 9 ，出IS

time distinguishing smaller establishments from the full sample . Broadly speaking , the
British results for the index measure of information and consultation suggest that worker
involvement tends to have positive effects in nonunion estab1ishments , but insignificant to
negative

e釘ects

in the union group. For

Germ組y ，

14

any favorable impact of works councils

is confined

to 也e

full sample. We next consíder these results and their implications in

more detail.

[Table 1 near here]

Britain. Taking the British evidence frrst , consider the results for the labor productivity

change measure , which we take to be closely related to the joint surplus. From the frrst
two columns of Table 2 it can be seen that in the nonunion case changes in both formal
and informal communication and consultation produce the anticipated positive coefficient
estimates for bOth form a1 and informal communication , whether the variables are taken
separately or as an ordered index.

[Tables 2 and 3 near here]

Yet for the union establishments , Table 3 indicates that there is no significant
effect of either type of communication and consultation , or for the ordered index. We
interpret these results as

indicating 也at

competitive pressures cause nonunion

establishments to adopt beneficial changes in communication and consultation , but that
there is no sign

of 出is

phenomenon in union establishments.

The picture is similar , though less clear-cut , for the employment change variable ,
while recognizing that employment change is not such a good indicator of movements in
the joint surplus . As can be seen from the last column of Table 2 , for nonunion
establishments the

coe前icient

estimate for the formal communication and consultation

change measure is positive but statistical1y insignificant ,

while 也at

for the informal variant

is positive and statistical1y significant. Combining formal and informal measures into an
index (see the third column of Table 2) yields a highly statistically significant positive
coefficient estimate.

For union establishments (the last two columns in Table

3) ，崗位e

are opposing

effects: increases in formal communication and consultation are associated with negative

15

employment

change's~:

while inéreases in the informal type seèm to be beneficial.

Nevertheless , the ordered index shows a significantly negative association.

[Tables 4 and 5 near here]
As for the level of finan仁ial performance , the commurtiéation and corisultation
variables as well as the index - now all in levels - are generally insignificarit for the
nonuniöri 'samplé. These results are reported in the frrst two cohl1nns öf Table 4 , and
accord with ouf priors: management in nonunion frrms chooses levèls of wörker
involvement , hígh or low , so as to achieve near-maximum performance. However , in the
sample of union establishments , by

con甘a哎，

there are c1ear signs of a negative effect for

the various measures of worker involvement (see the frrst two columns of Table 5). Most
notab旬，

the results for the ordered index indicate. a sharply negative effect.

Broadly speaking , the wage results are the other side of the fmanci a1 performance
coin. That is to say , worker involvement appears to raise wages in nonunion
establishments but to have no discernible impact among their union counterparts. On the
whole , these results are favorable to the view that , because the level of worker
involvement is chosen to optimize performance in the nonunion establishment , there can
be no association

between 也at

magnitude and the level of plant performance. However , in

union establishments too much worker involvement could well be chøsen.

Space

cons甘aints

prevent much discussion of the

variables. Focusing therefore on the

coe旺icients

productivi句 growth

for the

equation , we

con甘01

note 由at 也is

measure of performance is higher for older establishments , within establishments operating
a

payment-by-resul~電 scheme

and/or a profit-sharing scheme , and among establishments

with lower union density. These results tend to obtain across union and nonunion regim{
alike.

These British results are likely to be compared with those of Femie and Metcalf
(1 995). (See also Kersley and Martin , 1995.) However ,

our 甘eatment

differs in

comparing changes over time in performance with changes over time in worker
16

involvement. This enables us focus on a given establishment' s decisions through time ,
rather than comparing different establishments (which we see as essentially noncomparable
in the British case , at least in nonunion establishments , given the endogenous nature of
the worker involvement). We also emphasize the different decision processes in nonunion
and union establishments , and the zone of indeterminacy that surrounds decisions

00

worker involvement in the latter.

Germa份﹒ The

German results are presented in Tables 6 through 9. Throughout a

distinction is drawn between the full sample and a subsample of smaller finns employing
between

21 組d 1 ∞ workers. I3

Among the

latt仗，

roughly one-half of 由e frrms have

works councils , and the statutory powers of the works council are a datum. Unlike the
British case , it wiU be

recalled 出at

the impact of the

work.~

council is measured by the

coefficient estimate on a simple dichotomous variable indicating the presence or otherwise
of a works council. The limitation
bluntness -

is 由前，

of 由is

participation covariate - in addition to its

for our sample at least , a11 frrllls with

works councils. Unfortunately ,

with 曲的 dataset

1 ， α沁 or

more employees have

we are unable to construct an index of

worker involvement (although for one such attempt with German data , see Addison and
Wagner , 1997) or otherwise distinguish between "types" of works council. In any event ,
it remains true that the powers of the works council exceed those of a British JCC.

[Table 6 near here]

We next discuss the productivity , employment change , profitability , and wage
results in tum . Beginning with value-added per worker , the most notable result from
Table 6 is the difference in works council impact as between the full sample and the
smaller frrm subsample. For the former , works councils are associated with higher
productivity. No such relation is found among smaller frrffis. For Jarger
appears that the benefits

at甘ibuted

frrms ， 出凹 ，

it

to works councils by their proponents are real. One

interpretation would be that large firms need councils - or analogous forms of govemance
apparatus - to overcome the problems emphasized by the collective voice model ,
stemming 仕om

the public

g∞ds

nature of the workplace. Smaller frrms , on the other

hand , may face altogether less difficulty in ascertaining worker preferences and in
17

monitoring worker effort.
of works council

Despite 曲的 difference ，

impact 由at

the results are at odds with early studies

pointed to significant1 y lower (total factor) productivity in

works couocil regimes (e.g. Fit7--Roy and Kr aft , 1987).

[Tables 7 and 8 near here]

The employment

e釘'ects

of German works councils , charted in Table 7 , do not

offer any evidence of classic insider behavior. The association between works council
presence and employment change 1991-94 is negative , but the coefficient estimate is
poorly determined.

Table 8 gives the German results for profits. The depressing effect of works
couocils

on 也is

relative profitability measure is found for the total sample and the smaller

frrm subsample alike. A simi1ar result
rather than a

su~jecti間，

-也1S

time using the ratio of cash flow to capital

self-reported measure - was indeed reported in the early literature

(see FitzRoy and Kr aft , 1985).

on these resul的， there is some indication of distributive

bargainiog. 14

[Table 9 near here]

Table 9 gives the fitted wage equation and casts further light
results. W orks couocils can be seen to be associated

wi出 significant1y

other things being equal , and across all firms. It is not
exactly
the

how 也is

indus甘y

00

clear 仕om

the profitability

higher earnings ,

inspection of the data

wage advantage is secured - whether through local sett1 ements exceeding

tariff agreement or via wage (group) drift - but the result again underscores

the interpretation of the profit effect as

redis甘ibutive rather 血泊， s旬，由e

outcome of

cumbersome consultative procedures.

Finally , regarding the effects of the other covariates , among the more interesting
results are the following: the positive

e旺'ects

on value-added per employee of profit-

sharing schemes for managers (if not for the generality of employees) and of the
proportion of workers with a polytechnic/university degree (if oot the proportion of
18

s凶led

blue-collar workers); the adverse effect of nonwage labor costs on profitability; the role of
high-tech in stimulating employrilerit growth; and , fmally , the insignificance of flfm size
in wage determination and indeed , more generally.

6. Conclusions
The Freeman-Lazear model , suitably modified to take account of union presence
and

dis甘ibutive

resulû可 of

bargaíning , apþears consistent with the British evidence. The summary

Table 1 suggest clearly that in the nonunion fmn appropriate levels of worker

involvementare chosen. However , in the union flfm worker involvement seems to have
negative effects. Our interpretation here is that the wrong level of involvement is chosen
because of dis甘ibutive conflict , as might be predicted

from 也e

Freeman- Laze訂

model.

The German results are more complicated. Large establishments with works
councils

ap恨ar

to have higher productivity. The problem here is the presence of

consistently higher earnings in works counciI regimes and the absence of any productivity
effect in the small establishment sample. Consistently higher eamings across the"spectrutn
of works council establishments points to rent seeking behavior , even if this phenòmenon
does not seem to be accompanied by slower employment growth. In larger establishments
with works councils , the issue is whether higher productivity

offsev可 the

profit effect

(anticipated by the model) to yield higher total surplus. With the data at our disposal we
cannot answer this question definitively.

For small establishments

wi出 works

councils , we can rule out any increase ín .1 Olnt

surplus because of the combination of lower profitability and no increase in the valueadded productivity measure. Smaller establishments might therefore be well advised to
consider whether there are practical altematives to works councils , that is ,

measures 也a1

reduce the demand for such representation among the workforce. We are currently far
from being able to

It

iden位有，

follows 也at

such factors with any precision. 15

in both the cases of large and small establishments further

progres~

in analyzing the impact of works councils On efficiency requires additional data to

19

enable the researcher to get ~ bettet:

h~Qle

on total surplus. Even armed withsuch

information , the story does not end here because of possible works council effects on frrm
investments in tangible and intangible capital. That is to say , even if output is unch.anged
in the cross section , the effect of rent seeking on investment - via a capture of the quasirents to long-lived , relation-specific capital - may serve to lower efficiency (Hirsch ,
1991).

Admitt~dly

the limited data relating to investment behavior available to us in the

Hannover Firm Panel (conceming the

in甘oduction

of new products and production

processes in the preceding year) does not indicate that such investments are less in works
council regimes , irrespective of the size of the establishment.

But 也is

falls

f:征 short

of a

conclusive test. 16

And yet the bottom line is not that participation should be mandated. Participation
seems to work in the British case on a voluntaristi.c basis , the hallmark of that system' s
indus住ial relations 虹adition.

If we

ar訊le

that union regimes provide a setting analogous to

a mandate ，也en clearly the suggestion from the British evidence is 也at mandates do not
work. Participation is of cQurse mandated in Germany and , given 也at nation' s cen甘alised
industria1 relations system - which tends to limit if not remove dis住ibutive bargaining at
frrm Jevel - it could be argued 也at the Germans may have not got it far wrong. The
mandate at least in terms of the basic legislation dating back to 1952 (if not 1972) might
be seen as reflecting the interests of the two sides of indus訂y ， at least in large 自rms.

But there are nagginεworries about the "in甘usiveness" of worker involvement set
by the German mandate - again , a reference to the smaller frrm results. Our main
conclusion must be that it is local distributive bargaining which causes inappropriate levels
of worker involvement , just as predicted by the Lazear-Freeman model. A mandate is not
an easy solution to 也is problem given the heterogeneity of frrms.
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Endnotes
1. The following discussion abstracts from worker representation on the supervisory
bo訂ds

of companies . But 1t should be

noted 由at

three-quarters of the elected workforce

representatives on company boards covered by the 1976 Codetermination Act are a1so
members of the works council. For an

English 甘anslation

of the legislation described

here , the Works Constitution Act of 1972 , as amended in 1989 , see The Federal Minister
of Labour and Socia1 Affairs (1990).
2. The union has only to claim that it has at least one member in the plant; no formal
regls甘ation

procedure is required , and the identity of the union member does not have to

be disclosed.
3. The legislation also automatically provides for
with

more 由an

"cen甘al

works councils" in companies

one plant and for the election of "combine councils" in groups of

companIes.
4. For example , in establishments with between 300 and 600 employees , one (of the 9)
works counci l1ors is
9 ，∞ 1-10 ，∞o

released 台om

any work

duti郎，

whereas in plants with , say ,

employees eleven (of the 31) councillors are full time.

5. It should also be noted that the works council is explicitly held to a "peace obligation"
and cannot therefore withdraw labor.
6. For one study of the union-works council nexus , see Müller-Jentsch (1995) 64-65.
7. The main laws are the Employment Act of 1982 which simply requires companies with
over 250 employees to state annually in their company reports the initiatives 由ey have
taken to promote employee involvement , and the Finance Act of 1978 - and its
successors -

glvlng 組x

concessíons to companies allocating shares to staff on an all-

employee basis (see Hyman and Mason , 1995).
8. Full information on the sampling frame , interviews , and data editing procedure are
provided in

In台atest

Sozialforschung (1995) .

9. English 甘anslations of the first and second wave survey questionnaires are contained in
Brand et al . (1996). We note parenthetically that because of negligible changes in works
council statuS between the frrst and second waves , we were unable to exploit the panel
character of the data.
21

10. Where the dependent variable is categorical rather than continuous we use the ordered
probit estimator

(Madda尬，

1983).

11. Median establishment weekly pay data are available from the WIRS for three manual
occupational categories. From these median values , we calculate a manual worker pay
average for individual establishments using the employment proportions as weights.
12. It has been argued in the German case that profit sharing for workers is an altemative
form of worker "participation" available to more efficient managers , enabling them to
sidestep the paraphernalia and delayed decisionmaking of a council.
for managers has been identified

wi也 a

Al鉤，

profit sharing

more consensual management approach seeking

compromise , and thereby lesseoing the need for workers to elect works councils

00

defensive grounds. On these arguments , see Addison , Schnabel , and Wagner (l 997b).
13. We also experimeoted with a subsample of flfms employing 10-249 workers. The
main findings with respect to works council impact were unaffected. Full results are
available from the authors upon request.
14. In the German dataset we also have access to an absolute profit measure , again based
on a self-reported , five-element categorical measure. Grouping these categories in similar
fashion as for the relative (to other flfms) profit measure and rerunning the equation in
Table 8 strongly confrrmed the negative association between works council presence and
profitability. (See also Addison , Schnabel , and Wagner , 1997a.)
15 . Although we have elsewhere reported that teamwork is associated with a lower
probability of observing a works council , which might hint at the presence of real
alternatives (see Addison , Schnabel , and Wagner , 1997b).
16. More negative evidence , on the basis of actual investments in physical capital , albeit
for a much smaller sample , is reported in Addison , Kr aft , and Wagner (1993).
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Table l: Summary Result軍: . f~r Germany alld Britain of the EtTects of Work剝
Involveme"t 00 Firm Performance and Wages
Gennany - works couDcil effect
Al l establishments

Establishments with 21100 employees

Va1 ue-added per worker

positive (5%)

lnslg

Employmeot change

mS1g

lnslg

Profit level

negative (1 %)

negative (1 % )

Wage level

positive (1 % )

positive (1 0/0)

Brita訓-

index or infonnation 8nd joint consultatioD

effect
Union establishments

Nonunion establishments

Labor productivity change

mSlg

positive (1 0/0)

Employment change

negative (1 0/0)

positive (5 010)

Profit level

negative (1 %)

lnstg

Wage level

mSlg

positive (1 %)

Notes: The table gives the sign of the coefficient estimate on the works council dummy
for Gennany and 00 the index measure of infonnation and joint consultatìon (levels or
changes) for Britain. The tìgures in parentheses denote significance levels. Union
establishments in Britain are defined as those with a written agreement recognizing
either manual or nonmanual uruO Il5 for negotiating pay and conditions of empIoyment;
nonunion establishments, as defined, do not necessarily record zero union density
Source: Tables 2.9

Table2: Britain .... .Effects of Worker Involvement . 00 La bor 'P,roductivity and
Employmeot Change, NonunioD Establisbments
Labor Productivity Changea
Employment Changeb
Vari噎住一一一一一一一……_~(!2___一 ~.~_(~l~..____一…一__{!2. _~.~_一…-(止一--Constant
-0.004
-0.016
-22.644
-17 .255
(0.004)
(0 .016)
(0 .4 97)
(0.380)
-1. 284*
-1. 317*
0.023**
0.023**
Finn age
(age in years)
(2 .139)
(2 .136)
(1 .854)
(1. 910)
ln (Finn size)
。 189
0.191
14.272*
13 .500*
(l ogarithm of Firm size)
(1. 120)
(1. 138)
(1. 872)
(1 .776)
New JCC
1. 562**
14.271
(dummy= 1 if JCC
(2.251)
(0.710)
reorganized or estab1ished ,
1987-90)
New Infcon
0.649**
4 1. 536***
(dummy-l ifincrease in
(2.048)
(3 .072)
Infcon, 1987-90)
0.714***
NEWINVindex
19.005**
(index of JCC and Infcon
(2.969)
(2.270)
increases; range 0-3)
-0.] 23
.0.120
Single establishment
1. 518
0.144
(0.884)
(dummy= 1 if single
(0.843)
(0.157)
(0.015)
establishment)
0.010**
FemaJe
0.010**
-0 .134
-0.108
(petcentage female)
(2 .313)
(2.332)
(0.592)
(0 .4 76)
SkilJed
0.009***
0.009***
0.013
0.020
(4.349)
(percentage skilled workers)
(0.097)
(4.359)
(0.146)
0.001
Part time
0.060
0.001
。 044
(percentage pa吋 time)
(0 .462)
(0 .4 53)
(2.70)
(0.197)
6.70]
Shift
0.038
7.028
0.038
(0.722)
(0.244)
(0.685)
(dummy= 1 if shift work used) (0.248)
Piece rate
-10.055
-6.275
。 505**
。 513**
(0.806)
(2 .461 )
(2 .4 17)
(dummy= 1 if payments by
(0.506)
results used for any work
group)
Market power
0.131
8.845
8.836
。 129
(dununy= 1 if dominant
(0.834)
(0.844)
(0.935)
(0.930)
finnlfew competitors)
Export
0.288
0.287
15 .594
16.356
(1.
111)
(dumm y= 1 if product mainly
(1. 100)
(1. 040)
(1. 096)
exported)
Automated
0.211
0.206
-30.089*** 明30.080* 糾
(1. 005)
(0 .980)
( dummy= 1 if automated
(2.680)
(2.669)
mac恤les used)
Profit sharing
0.308**
0.316**
0.106
-2.209
(dummy= l ifused)
(2.273)
(2.266)
(0.241)
(0.012)
Density
-0.009**
-0.009**
0.053
。 033
(percentage of work force in
(2.484)
(2.483)
(0.138)
(0.224)

Table 3: Britain - Effects of Worker Involv~ment
Employment Change, Union Establishments

00

Labor Productivity a lÍ d

Labor Productivity Change

一封的些一一呵，一一一一 ， 一一 一 月 一一 (!2..
Constant
Firm age
1n (Firm size)

4.165
(1. 233)
0.055*
(1. 928)
-0.317
(1. 128)

………"'....-......-.. .0; 仿 _.-.-..-一 一~(D_.…一一…正在一一
4.366
(1 .256)
0.057*
(1. 945)
國 0 . 339

(1. 228)

New JCC

國 0 . 163

New Infcon

(0.301)
0.514
(1. 353)

NEWINV index

Employment Change
-]2 1. 59***
(2.634)
-0.347
(0.322)
25 .909***
(4.083)

0. 1 日

-35 . 696***

(0.906)

(4 .790)
4.955
(0.284)
-0.664**
(2 .520)
0.598***
(3.917)
-0.130
(0.444)

-108 .01**
(2.437)
-0.326
(0 .3 16)
2 1.794***
(3.561)
-159.86***
(7 .916)
19.362*
(1. 699)

~ . 387
-0.293
15.342
(1 .313)
(0.776)
(0.911)
Female
-0.017***
-0.017***
-0.342
(3 .362)
(3 .286)
(1. 328)
Slcilled
0.002
0.001
0.562***
(3 .833)
(0.711)
(0.302)
Part time
0.015
0.013
-0.348
(1.498)
(1 .209)
(1. 231)
Shiftwork
0 .2 78
0 . 264
個 5 . 658
-9.258
(0.774)
(0.885)
(0.821)
(0.454)
l252*1246*22.10230297**
Piece rate
(1 .770)
(1. 742)
(1 .547)
(2 .202)
Market power"。 293431624101**25535 料
(0.993)
(1 .070)
(1 .986)
(2.194)
Export
O5 0 6 O 453.7225.17775
(1. 238)
(1 .076)
(0.400)
(1. 022)
Automated
O O6l
O O22-19336*-21 . 487 材
(0.198)
(0 .070)
(1.863)
(2. J 58)
proat sharing
O3 6 2 O 4 1 9 0 7 0 0 5 1 5 3
(1. 460)
(1. 519)
(0.062)
(0.474)
Density
-O OO64. 0084466**"。 549***
(1 .328)
(1. 530)
(2 .311)
(2.832)
1史的做些Mi--………pcluded 一 included
included
included
Pseudo R L
0.408
一一一百石了、…… 0 . 115
0 .228

Single establishment

n ……………………… 23三… -

/t/-values in parentheses

237449449

Notes: * , ** , * ** denotes sígnificance at the . 10多 0. 05 ， and .. 01 Jevels , respectively.
See Table 2 for definition of variables

unions)
坐坐笠旦旦旦控啞巴i…一一一-MUM--JJ旦旦控告
， ism- …i哇啦ded …斗哩luded
Pseudo RL
0.244
0.196
0.018
0 .079
291
291
424
424
n
Itl-values in parentheses.
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at the .10, .05 , and .01 levels, respectively
a The manager's assessment ofthe level oflabor productivity in the
establishment relative to three years ago , 1987-90
b Employment change, 1987-90

00

,

… 一
材料

，

2 9394

764269
一

冉一*}}*})

(

，

36

2 一呵，'
，028244
6

』-+eET
*ll*iv

一

一)。。

…
戶

一何

A 仆仆位V
叭扎
m
刀向科
吋
代U
--m
-

一
WJ*

叫一

}

一)一
9qd48
l 叫739924
…

、./、
y

，

1

、y

叭
mo

ωOA吋仆仆幻仔

、PJ

HUOO51318

九2459876

，

12 .4 28***
(2.673)

0.007
(0.051)
5.889**
(2 .496)

-0.051
(0.668)
。 172

(1. 273)
0.005
(1. 602)
-0 .002
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-0 .189
(1. 557)
-0.526***
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向0.153

(1. 142)
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0.039
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0.001
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0.176
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0.005
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-0.002
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-0.004
(1. 562)
-0.180
(1. 448)
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Table 4: Britain 圓 Effects of Worker lnvolvement
Levels, Nonunion Establisbments

0.094 一一一 可誦了 一

止，一一一一一一一…-iZ」一

8.277*
(1. 784)

8.586*
(1. 853)

-1. 004***

間1. 024***

(8.188)
0.339***
(4.726)
-1. 043***
(9.201)
-5 .338
(1. 135)

(8.330)
0.322***
(4 .4 56)
-1. 050***
(9.280)
-4 .4 70
(0.947)

-0 .051

圈。 871

(0 ∞9)

(0.149)
-4.990
(1. 091)
40.132***
(5 .486)
6.336
(1 .190)
-4 .248
(0.946)
0 .2 94***
(2.711)
încluded

-4 .4 27
(0.969)
38.740***
(5 .319)
6.943
(1. 304)
-3 .634
(0.810)
0 . 292***

(2 .684)

included

O .茄子一一

o三09

-ZL一 - 364
364
Itl-values in parentheses
Notes: * ** *艸 denote significance at the .10 , .05 , and .01 levels, respectively

一一

, a Profitability lsan index meaSOre 'definedi as the rrùinag缸~ s asse'S sment of the

establishment' s financial performance relative to other establishments in the
same industry
b Wages are defined as average pay for manua1 workers
Al1 other variables are as de fi. ned in Table 2
,

Table 5: Britain . Effects of Worker Involvement on Profit and Wage Levels ,
U oion Establishments
Profit
VVages
Va哇哇ble 一………一一一一 .- . . -. ..~..~--一一， 一 … ~___i})一…一一一-_. _~~} 一 … _ .. ._Q1______ 叫一一一一位一一一-Constant
2.152**
2 .4 56* **
147.97 *** 145 .4 7***
(2 .530)
(2.812)
(7.704)
(7 .4 85)
-0 .071 ***
0.306
0.252
Finn age
-0.070***
(4 .796)
(4.710)
(0 .732)
(0 .595)
In (Firm size)
0.203
0.189
2.047
2.245
(1. 240)
(1 .158)
(0 .705)
(0.171)
JCC
-0 .164
-6 .4 18
(0.699)
(1. 236)
Infcon
-0.474**
1. 842
(2 .227)
(0 .357)
INV index
-0. 179 艸
-2 . 125
(2.010)
(0 .938)
Single estabIi shment
-0.260
-0.330
9.021
9.574
(1. 047)
(1 .257)
(1 .309)
(1. 383)
Female
0.0002
0.002
-1. 189***
-1. 190***
(0 .049)
(0 .322)
(10.20)
(10.212)
Ski1Ied
0.009***
0.008***
0.183***
0.189***
(3 .506)
(2 .959)
(2 .649)
(2.724)
-0 . 01 戶
-0 . 011 *
-1. 922***
-1. 932***
Part time
(1 .910)
(1. 774)
(1 5.13)
(1 5.138)
18.760***
19.184***
Shiftwork
-0.835***
-0.836***
(3 .979)
(3 .882)
(3 .816)
(3 .881)
Píecerate
0.216
0 .2 11
-2 .268
-2 . 172
(0 .3 83)
(0.367)
(0 .987)
(0 .952)
Market power
-0 . 528 叫*
-0.540***
3.827
4.026
(3 .039)
(3 .042)
(0.792)
(0.832)
. 0 2 2 9 - 0 2 0 7 . l o 650-11352
Export
(0.843)
(0.753)
(1. 526)
( 1. 615)
Automated
0 .743***
0.714***
6 .303
6.232
(3 .340)
(3 .254)
(1. 308)
(1. 293)
proat sharing
O 405**0.337*19662***19839***
(2 .041)
(1. 657)
(4 .269)
(4.301)
A O O 6 4 0 0 6 O I32
0. i21
Density
(1. 369)
(1 .313)
(1.4 66)
(1 .332)
也吸Iy~umqEL--……一…主些1世些一一
includedncluded
included
Pseudo R L
0ω3
打川示丸
4 一一一一-可v一一一w苟 可3
沛η77
子
γ
一 ……
…0.598 一
0.612 吋

l

………凡叫』

|川
t叫J -value
的s

in parentheses

Notes:﹒弋*大*村 denote significance at the . 10， 的 ， and .01 levels , respectively.
See Tables 2 and 4 for definition of variables

Table 6:

Germany ﹒ Effi忱的 of W 000

Councils 00 Value-Added Per Worker

Variable
Constant
Works council
(dummy= 1 if works council present)
Firm size
(number of employees)
Firm size squared
Branch plant
(dummy= 1 if branch plant)
Fírm age
( dummy= 1 if founded before 1960)
Female
(percentage female)
Skilled
(percentage skilled workers [Facharbeiter])
Degree
(percentage with PolytechniclUniversity
degree)
Part time
(percentage pa吋 time)
Shift work
(dummy= 1 if shift work used)
Hours
(Usual number ofhours worked per week)
Capacity
(index for capacity utilization , ranging 台01n
1(<85 percent) to 6(> 100 percent))
Advanced technology
(dummy= 1 if state-of-the-art production

All establishments
Establishments with
一 - 21.1QQCImi啞巴竺s
66.82
45 .91
(0 .81 )
(0 .37)
9 .4 3
15 .40* *
(2 .4 8)
(1. 27)
-0.03**
1. 20
(2 .03)
(1. 63)
0 .11 E-4
0 .01
(1. 75)
(1 .62)
1 1. 10
5.16
(1.4 4)
(0 .4 5)
-1 1. 72**
2.65
(2 .29)
(0 .4 3)
-0.70***
-0 .4 3*
(4.20)
(1. 92)
-0.10
。 05
(0 .4 1)
(0 .84)
l. 24***
1. 93**
(2 .86)
(2 .21)
-0.50***
(2.66)
2 1. 01 ***
(3 .10)
0 .70
(0.34)
3.74***
(2 .64)

-0.67**
(2 .51)
22.08***
(2 .79)
0.95
(0.30)
4 .36**
(2 .13)

9.52*
(1 .86)

0.97
(0 .16)

J4,

Qoit

、

'l

、，/申亭、‘， 、‘，/

<

**

inc1 uded
included
94 一…
n ……2一…一τ芳5
τ
一一一…
H……血…圖
…
一
互互茲

τ
u

………日一一一……
一血一一‘…
叫

n ………奮申胃一……h

i性tl←-va
訓lu
肘
les

.•

而 /-it

R2

4-nv

k

J對旦旦旦血旦旦全L一一一一

6 .75
(0.95)
1 1. 93**
(2 .42)
-1 .83
(0 .33)

可3iz

Profit sharing for employees
(dummy= 1 ifused)
Profit sharing for management
(dummy= 1if used)
Market share
(dummy= 1 if market share of main product
more than 50/0 in main market)

/
ORunyfoζJ
巾。37 . 1 弓 4

technolo勘r)

in parentheses

→一……一…巴…一一一……一…

Notes: * , **, *** denotes significance at the .10, .05 , and .01 levels, respectively.

Table 7: Germany 國 EtTects ofWorks Councilson Employment Change

丘?φ1β7空t吋哇立.…
……
U…M…….一……曰一島叫一……
‘一一】一…、..一
……A一- …
Constant

Works council
Firm size
Finn size squared
Branch plant
Firm age
Female

AlI establishments

Establishments wÍth

-11 .002
(0.86)
-6 .600
(1. 15)
-0.023
(1. 61)
0.16 E-5
(1. 62)
-7.621
(1 .28)
-14.649 **
(2.22)

-70 .831
(1. 29)
-1. 210
(0 .13)
0.969
(0.73)
-0.87 E-2
(0 .75)
-2.880
(0.20)
-13 .713
(1.24)
-0.115
(0 .45)
-0.049
(0 .37)
12.104
(1. 40)
-0 .260
(0.82)
9.750
(1. 10)
-7.758
(0.96)
13 .264
(1. 63)
-1. 221
(0 .4 5)
6.255
(0.90)
-18 . 114
(1. 23)

。.024

(0.24)
Skilled
Degree
Part time
Shift work
Short time
(dummy = 1 if short-time work used)
Overtime
(dummy= 1 if overtime used)
Capacity utilization
Advanced technology
Wages
(dummy= 1 if higher than coIl ective
agreement)

a

。 015

(0.22)
3.869*
(1. 71)
-0.269
(1. 52)
5.285
(0.80)
-1 1. 3 12 ***
(3 .10)
14.176***
(2.63)
0.395
(0.18)
9.813***
(2 .61)
-10.809
(0.95)

且也笠立坐控告s
……一一一……一一且空空空一一一…且坐到三d
2

R
0.126
0.290
n
848
353
\t\-values in parentheses
Notes: * , **, *** denote significance at the .10, .05 , and .01 levels, respectively
a Employment change Îs measured over 1991-94
see Table 6 for definition of other variables

Table 8: Germ30y -

Eff~ts

,

of Works Couß ils 00

Profitability~ .

一一一 …...-.，..--....................................~"".... ..， ..........' ~....~-----~一一……一…

All establishments
Variable
W orks council
Firm size
Firm size squared
弘1:arket

share

Capacity utilization
Advanced technology
Profit sharing for employees
Profit sharing for management

-0.327* **
(3 .39)
0.214 E-3
(1 .14)
-9 .40 E-9
(0 .63)
0.258***
(2 .63)
0.099***
(3 .20)
0.338***
(3.76)
0.119
(1 .01)
。 405***

(4 .37)
Wage costs
(dumm y= l ifwage costs judged too high)
Non wage labor costs
(dummy= 1 if non-wage labor costs judged
too high)

-0 .036

(0.39)
-0.483***
(4 .74)

Establishments with
21-1.Q9..~'.l1pl.<?y~e~
-0.606***
(3 .89)
0.012
(0 .67)
-0 .77E-4
(0.53)
0.119
(0 .79)
0.100**
(2.04)
0.326**
(2.18)
0 .3 13*
(1. 68)
0.217
(1.4 4)
-0 .040
(0 .26)
-0.757***
(4.15)

lnd白皮且也mmt設一一………昕一-……… mc控告ι一…一…」Ehded
2

R
0.095
0.157
n
817
335
Itl-values in parentheses
N otes: * , * *, * ** denote significance at the . 10 ，的 ， and .01 levels , respectively.
a Profitability is an index measure derived on the basis of the manager' s
assessment of performance relative to other firms in the same industry
See Table 6 for definition of other variables

Table 9: Germany . Effects of Works Councils

00

Wages

a

Al I establishments

y~.~.~!~ ..

- ....__.. . - ... .

.._........ .....

1
.一← 21-1 ∞
_~Qloy~es 也

10.82***
(22 .88)
0.14***
(3 .4 9)
-0 .53 E-4
(0 .78)
-0 .3 5 E-8
(0 .82)
-0 .04
(0.73)
。 59 E-3
(0.02)
-0.30E-2***
(3 .26)
-0.16 E-2**
(2.20)
0.01 ***
(5 .29)
-0.80 E-2***
(4 .53)
0.10***
(2 .84)
-0.68 E-3
(0.06)

Constant
Works council
Firm size
Firm size squared
Branch plant
Firm age
Female
Skilled
Degree
Part time
Shift work
Hours
Overtime
Profit sharing for employees
Market share

主控曰:金組豆豆甘一一一一一一一一一
R
L

Establishments with

一一一一

11. 58***
(12 .93)
0.17***
(2 .61)
-0 .01
(1 55)
0.86 E-4
(1 .61)
-0.11
(0 .75)
-0.04
(0.62)
-0.17E-2
(1. 02)
-0.16 E-2
(1. 33)
0.94 E-2**
(2.00)
-0.82 E-2**
(2.39)
0.07
(1. 28)
-0.02
(0.71)
0 . 07 制定
0.13**
(2 .23)
(2 .25)
。 .05
0.08
(1. 16)
(1 .20)
-0.03
-0.03
(l. 06)
(0.63)
incJud吋
included
- 1滿一一 ……可否γ一一……

34 空 間
E jg
~d u
Itl-v ues in parentheses
Notes: * , * *, *** denote sìgnificance at the .10 . 05 and .01 ]evels~
respectively
歹
,
a
The dependent variabie is the naturai ioguithn ofthe average
wage per
employee
See TabJes 6 and 7 for definition of variables
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D r. William K .M . Lee

4 (4/93)

European Monetary Integration: Experiences and Future Prospects

Professor Dieter Cassel and
Dr. Thomas Apolte

5 (5/93)

Whither Hong Kong in an Open-Door, Reforming Chinese Economy?
(Published in The Pacific Review (London), Vo l. 6 No .4, Dec 1993, pp. 333-351

M r. Y. P . Ho and
Professor Y. Y . Kueh

6 (6/93)

China's Rise , Russ ia 's Fall : Po licy Choice or System

7 (7 /93)

Economic Integration Within Greater China: Trade and Investment Flows
Between Mainland China , Hong Kong and Taiwan
(Published in The China Quarte~!i: No . 136, Dec 1993, pp . 771-745)

D r. Robert F. Ash and
Professor Y.Y. Kueh

8 (1194)

North Korean Nuclear Weapons Policy : An Expected Utility Analysis

D r. David Newman and
D r. Brian Bridges

9 (2/94)

Economic Reforms and Inequ aJ ity in China

Dr. Joseph C. H. Chai and
Ms. B . Karin Chai

t 0 (3/94)

lndustrial Deregulation and Economic Restructuring in China
A GA TT Perspective

Professor Y. Y. Kueh

11 (4/94)

The Political Development ofChina, Taiwan and Hong Kong Since the Late
1970s: Problems and Prospects

M r. Yiu -chung Wong

12 (5/94)

Decreasing Cost and Profit M a.,< imization in Cournot Duopoly Models

D r. Kai-cheong Lei

13 (6/94) CAPS

Co rrupti on by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Li censing

D r. Melanie Manion

14 (7/94 )CPPS

Economics as a Conceptual Resource for the Study ofPubJic Management

Professor David L. Weimer and
Professor Aidan R. Vining

15 (8/94)CAPS

The Fi 的
China

Professor Y. Y . Kueh
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Dragon:

Di 旺erence

Aspects ofthe Economic Take-off in Guangdong Province ,

D r. Peter Nolan

Kim Jong-il and the Future ofNorth Korea

Dr . Brian Bridges

17 (2/95)CPPS

Mandatory Occupatio nal Retirement Savings
Towards a Program Design Agenda for Hong Kong

M r. John Dixon

(3 月 5)CAPS

Ideological Congruence in the Chinese Countryside
Vi l1 ag巴 Lead 巴 rs and their Electorates and SeJectorates

D r. Melanie Manion

19 (4/95)CPPS

The Road to China: Hong Kong ' s Transition to Chi ne se Sovereignty

D r. David Ncwman

20 (5/95)CAPS

The Division of Labor , Product Quality , and the Pattem & the Dynamic Effect of
Intemational Trade

D r. C. Simon Fan

21 (6/95)CPPS

Reducing Moral Hazard in Deposit lnsurance
A PoJicy lnstrument for Generating Regulatory lnform ation

D r. C. Simon Fan

22 (7/95)CPPS

Occupational Stress among Schoolteachers
A Review of Res 巳 arch Findings Relevant to Policy Formation

Ms. Oi -l ing Siu

23 (8/95)CPPS

A Model of Intergenerational Transfers Based on " Evo lutionary" Altruism

D r. C. Simon Fan

24 (9/95)CPPS

lnitial Human Cap ital Distribution and Long Run lncome Distribution

D r. C. Simon Fan

Growth-In f1 ation Tradeoff in China

D r. Hiroyuki Imai
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26 (lIl95)CPPS

Managerialism-something Old , Something Borrowed , Something New :
Making Govemment More Business-like

D r. 10hn Dixon

27 (1 2/95)CPPS

Congestion Pricing and Public Transport

D r. Lok-sang Ho and
Mr. Wing-chung Pun

28 (l 3/95)CAPS

China's Foreign Policy in the Mid-1990s

Professor Joseph Yu-shek Cheng

29 (1 /96)CAPS

Explaining China's B lI siness Cycles

D r. Hiroyuki lmai

30 (2/96)CPPS

Stress at Work , Coping , and Workers' Health of an Acquired Firm in Hong Kong

Ms. Oi-ling Siu

31 (3/96)CPPS

A Universal Fully-funded Pension Scheme

D r. Lok-sang Ho

32 (4/96)CPPS

Commercialising Governmen t: A Challenging Agenda

D r. John Dixon

(5月 6)CAPS

China's Road to Exchange Rate Liberalisation

Dr. Lol• sang Ho

34

(6月 6)CAPS

The Role of Hong Kong in Sino-US Economic Relations

Professor Y. Y. Kueh and
D r. Thomas Voon

35

(7 月 6)CAPS

Export Competitiveness ofChina and ASEAN in the US Market

Dr. Thomas Voon

36 (8/96)CPPS

Institutional Foundations for a Just Society

D r. Lok-sang Ho

37 (9/96)CPPS

Piece Rate Payment Schemes and the Employment of Women
The Case of Hong Kong
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Public Policy on Local Administration in Hong Kong: Past , Present and Future

D r. Yiu -chung Wong

39 (lIl96)CPPS

Occupational Stress Among Factory Workers in Hong Kong and China:
A Comparison Study

Ms. Oi-ling Siu

40 (12/96)CPPS

Wage Subsidies as a Labour Market Policy Tool

D r. Lok-sang Ho

41 (13/96)CAPS

Political Pragmatism on the Chinese Campus since 1989

42 (l 4/96)CPPS

Delayed Compensation and the Hiring ofOlder Workers :
Evidence from Hong Kong

Professor 10hn S. Heywood ,
D r. Lok-sang Ho and
D r. Xiangdong Wei

43 (1 5/96)CAPS

Impacts of Foreign Policies on the Gains from Research and Promotion

D r. Thomas Voon

44 (l 6/96)CPPS

Hedonic Pricing for Prawn and Sh rimp in the Philippines

D r. Thomas Voon

45 (1197) CAPS

China and the Prospects for Economic Integration within APEC

Professor Y. Y. Kueh
D r. Thomas J. Voon and
D r. Xíangdong Wei

(2月 7)

CAPS

Export Competition Among Chína and ASEAN in the US Market
Application ofMarket Share Models

47

(3月 7)

CAPS

Hong Kong ' s Outward Processing Investment in China:
Its Implications on Hong Kong Economy
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China - Taiwan ' s Trade and Investment Relations and their Impact on Taiwan 's
lncome Distribution

D r. K C. Lei

D r. C. Simon Fan
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Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment in China
An Application ofth 巴 Transaction Cost Approach
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Exports and Technology Transfer to China

D r. Elspeth Thom:

Income Protection and the Elderly
An Examination of Social Security Policy in Singapore

D r. William Keng-
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Old A lI y Verslls New Friend : China's Economic Relations w ith the Two Koreas

D r. Brian Bridges

53

(9月 7)
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Hong Kong as a Financial Centre o f Greater China

Professor Y. C. J ao
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54 (10 /97) CAPS

The Economic Li nk-up of Hong Kong and Guangdong
Structural and Developmental Problems

Professor Shu-ki Tsang and
D r. Yuk-shing C heng

55 ( 11 /9 7) CPPS

Electoral C!eavages and the Post-1 997 Hong Kong 's Political Dynamics

Dr. Pang去wong Li

56 (J 2/9 7) CPPS

A Study ofOccupatìonal Stress , Job Satisfaction , and Quitting lntention ìn Hong
Kong Finns : The Role of Locus of Co ntrol and Organizational Com mitment

M s. Oi-ling Si u

57 (13/97) CPPS

A Mode l of Human Nature and Personal Development

Professor Lok-sang Ho

58 ( 14/9 7) CPPS

Wage Compensation for Job Ri sks : The Case of Hong Kong

Dr. W . S. S iebert and
Dr. Xiangdong Wei

59 (15/97) CPPS

Positìve Effects of Modem ization on Later Li fe

Dr. Kenneth W . K. Law

60 (16/97) CPPS

Fi1ial Piety and Caregiving Burden in Shanghai , People ' s Republic ofChina

Professor
Professo r
Professor
Professor

6 1 (17 /9 7) CPPS

How to Hclp the Rehabilitated Drug Abu sers Not to Relapse to Drugs Again?
A Successfu l Case . Hong Kong

Dr. Wai -kin Che

62 ( 18/9 7) C PPS

The Valu e ofTime and the lnteraction ofthe Quantìty & the Quality ofChildren

Dr. Chengze Simon Fan

63 ( 19/97) CPPS

Generatio nal Dependency and Elderly Care
A Psychological Interpretation ofCultural Norms and Exc hange

Dr. Ying-yi Hong and
Professor William T. Liu

64 (20/97) CPPS

Li ving Arrangements and Elderl y Care : The Case of Hong Kong

Professor Rance P. L. Lee ,
Dr. Jik-Joen Lee,
Pro fess or Elena S. H. Yu,
Professor Shang-Gong Sun and
Professor Willi am T. Li u

65 (2 1/97) C PPS

The Social Origin of Alzhei mer ' s Disease : A Path Analys is

Professor Will iam T. Li u and
Professor Shang-Gong Sun

66 (22/9 7) CAPS

Co untry ofOrigin Rules : lts O rigin , Nature and Directi ons for Reform

Professor Lok-sang Ho
Professor Lok-sang Ho

67

(23月 7)

CAPS

A Long Tenn Monetary Strategy for Hong Kong and Chi na

68

(24月 7)

CPPS

Are Union Jobs

\月l orse?

Are Gove rnment Jobs Better?

William T. Li u ,
Elena S. H. Yu ,
Shang-Gong Sun and
Yin Kean

Professor John S. Heywood ,
Professor W . S. Siebert and
Dr. Xiangdong Wei

69 (25 /97) CPPS

Restru ctu rin g the Party/state Relati ons
China' s Pol itical Structural Reform in the 1980s

Dr. Yiu-chung Wong

70 (26 /97) CPPS

Estimating Briti sh Workers ' Oemand for Safety

Dr. X iangdong Wei

71 (27/97) CPPS

Managerial Stress in Hong Kon g and Taiwan : A Comparative Study

Ms . Oi -lin g S 山 ，
Dr. Luo Lu and
Professo r Cary L. Cooper

72 (28/97) CPPS

reaching Social Science in the East Asian Context

Professor Wíll íam T. Liu

73 ( 1/9 8) CPPS

Interpretin g the Basic Law with Ch inese C haracteris tics

Professor J ames C. Hsiung

74 (2 /9 8) CPPS

Worker Participation and Firm Performance : Evidence from Germany and Britain

Professor John T. Addison
Profe ssor W . Stan ley Siebert
Pro [esso r Joachim Wagner and
Dr. X iangdong Wei
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